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Recently, scientiﬁc workﬂows have emerged as a platform for automating and accelerating
data processing and data sharing in scientiﬁc communities. Many scientiﬁc workﬂows have
been developed for collaborative research projects that involve a number of geographically
distributed organizations. Sharing of data and computation across organizations in differ-
ent administrative domains is essential in such a collaborative environment. Because of the
competitive nature of scientiﬁc research, it is important to ensure that sensitive informa-
tion in scientiﬁc workﬂows can be accessed by and propagated to only authorized parties.
To address this problem, we present techniques for analyzing how information propagates
in scientiﬁc workﬂows. We also present algorithms for incrementally analyzing how infor-
mation propagates upon every change to an existing scientiﬁc workﬂow.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Today, scientists use scientiﬁc workﬂows to integrate, structure, and orchestrate a wide range of local and remote het-
erogeneous services and applications to perform various in silico experiments to produce scientiﬁc discoveries [27,20,19,37].
As a result, scientiﬁc workﬂows have become the de facto cyberinfrastructure upper-ware for e-Science [26]. Many scien-
tiﬁc workﬂows have been developed for collaborative research projects that involve a number of geographically distributed
organizations. Sharing of data and computation across organizations in different administrative domains is essential in such
a collaborative environment. Because of the competitive nature of scientiﬁc research, it is important to ensure that sensitive
information in scientiﬁc workﬂows can be accessed by and propagated to only authorized parties.
Let us consider a collaborative brain disorder research project that is conducted by a collaboration among two hospitals
H1 and H2, a medical researcher R , and a computer scientist C . A typical medical scenario for using a scientiﬁc workﬂow
is shown in Fig. 1. This ﬁgure shows various principals, datasets, and software tools in the system. In the ﬁgure, an oval
represents a principal within the system; an arrow represents the direction of information ﬂow between two principals;
a square box represents a piece of data that is ﬂowing; and a double oval represents a trusted software program. Each
principal deﬁnes its own information ﬂow policy which speciﬁes a set of principals that can access its data. In our example,
each patient p has two pieces of data: Positron Emission Tomography (PET) data that can be retrieved from hospital H1, and
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) data that can be retrieved from hospital H2. Each hospital limits the data
only to the patient and the hospital itself. This is represented by {p, H1} and {p, H2}, respectively. The program “Retrieve
Data” is a trusted program which is run by the hospital to anonymize all personal information in the data and provide the
anonymized data to researcher R (labeled with {p, R}). Researcher R can invoke a neuroimaging analysis workﬂow W to
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identify each patient p’s ﬁber tract pattern and abnormal cortical regions. In workﬂow W , arrows represent data channels
and boxes represent workﬂow tasks. Workﬂow W consists of three tasks: skull stripping, registration, and ﬁber tracking.
S0, . . . , S3 specify the hosts at which workﬂow tasks are executed. In addition, a subworkﬂow for conformal mapping is
reused in two branches of the same workﬂow. The execution of the workﬂow also needs the interaction from a computer
scientist who speciﬁes appropriate parameters. Finally, the result of the study is only readable to the patient and R . This is
achieved by label {R, p}.
Based on the information ﬂow policy prescribed by hospital H1, a mechanism is needed to ensure that a patient’s PET
data, which is released from hospital H1, can be accessed by and propagated to only authorized parties: hospital H1, the
patient herself, and researcher R . The PET data should not be accessed by or propagated to unauthorized parties such as
hospital H2. However, consider the following scenario. First, the PET data for a patient p stored in H1 is retrieved via the
Retrieve Data program and released to researcher R . Second, R executes workﬂow W . After the execution of tasks skull strip-
ping and registration, the PET information is propagated to the ﬁrst branch of the workﬂow. Third, the ﬁber tracking task in
the ﬁrst branch gets executed and the PET information is further propagated to the conformal subworkﬂow. Finally, suppose
one of the tasks in the conformal subworkﬂow writes a ﬁle at a site that is owned by hospital H2, then a violation of the in-
formation ﬂow policy prescribed by hospital H1 occurred: the PET information is indirectly propagated to hospital H2. Such
a violation can be hard to be detected manually due to the complexity of information ﬂows among and within workﬂow
tasks, particularly for large-scale hierarchical scientiﬁc workﬂows.
To address the above problem, we present information ﬂow analysis techniques for analyzing how information propagates
in scientiﬁc workﬂows. Our analysis techniques deal with both explicit and implicit information ﬂows. Further, workﬂows
tend to evolve over time and it would be ineﬃcient to perform information ﬂow analysis from scratch upon every small
change to the structure of a workﬂow. Incremental analysis is useful in situations where small changes to the workﬂow
lead to small or no changes to the analysis results. In this paper, we present an algorithm for incrementally analyzing
information ﬂows whenever a change is made to the structure of a workﬂow. We have also developed a prototype system,
called Infoﬂow Analyzer, to validate and demonstrate our approaches. Although we present our analysis techniques in the
context of scientiﬁc workﬂows, such techniques are also applicable to business workﬂows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of hierarchical state machines. In Section 3,
we present techniques for analyzing how information propagates in scientiﬁc workﬂows. We have also presented an algo-
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rithm for incrementally performing information ﬂow analysis for evolving scientiﬁc workﬂows. The implementation details
are given in Section 4. The related work and our concluding remarks appear in Sections 5 and 6, respectively.
2. Background: Hierarchical state machines
A Hierarchical State Machine (HSM) [6] K is a tuple 〈K1, . . . , Kn〉 of modules, in which each module Ki has the following
components:
1. A ﬁnite set Ni of states, including a set of entry states Ii , a set of exit states O i , and a set of internal states Ei that are
neither entry states nor exit states.
2. A ﬁnite set Bi of sub-modules. The sets Ni and Bi are pairwise disjoint.
3. An indexing function Yi : Bi → {i + 1 . . .n}, which maps each sub-module b of Ki (b ∈ Bi) to j with j > i. If Yi(b) = j,
then b is a reference to the deﬁnition of module K j . Each pair (b,u) with u ∈ I j is called a call of Ki and each pair
(b, v) with v ∈ O j is called a return of Ki .
4. A transition edge relation Ei of the form u
G,A−→ v where the source u is either a state or a return of Ki , the sink v is
either a state or a call of Ki , G is a conditional guard, and A is an action.
Intuitively, a call of Ki is an entry state of a sub-module of Ki and a return of Ki is an exit state of a sub-module of Ki .
Transitions are edges connecting states and modules with one another. A guard G over a transition speciﬁes the condition
under which the transition can be performed, and an action A is a sequence of variable assignments.
In an HSM, a state can be an ordinary state or a superstate, which is an HSM itself. An HSM K can be “ﬂattened”
to a ﬁnite state machine by recursively substituting each reference of K with the corresponding sub-module. Because the
references of the same sub-module can reside in different modules, each module can appear in a number of different
contexts. It has been shown in [6] that ﬂattening may cause exponential blow-up, especially when there are many references
pointing to the same module. A module is called a top-level module if it does not have parent modules. All references in the
hierarchical state machine should form an acyclic graph.
Fig. 2 gives an example of an HSM. We use squares to denote module deﬁnitions and round-corner rectangles to denote
module references. The entry states, exit states, and internal states are denoted by ◦, •, and ⊗, respectively. Guards and
actions are omitted in the ﬁgure. There are two modules: K1 and K2. K1 is a top-level module that contains three sub-
modules r1, r2, r3, all of which are references to K2, i.e., Y1(r1) = Y1(r2) = Y1(r3) = 2. K1 has one entry state n1 and one
exit state n9. (r1,m1), (r2,m1), and (r3,m1) are the calls of K1. (r1,m5), (r2,m5), and (r3,m5) are the returns of K1. K2 is
a module with ﬁve states and ﬁve transitions.
3. Information ﬂow analysis of scientiﬁc workﬂows
This section presents information ﬂow analysis techniques for scientiﬁc workﬂows and an algorithm for incrementally
performing information ﬂow analysis for evolving scientiﬁc workﬂows. We consider the workﬂows with the following con-
trol ﬂow patterns: sequence, exclusive choice, parallel split, synchronization, simple merge, and condition. We assume that
the permission for executing each workﬂow task is obtained from some appropriate access control mechanisms. We also
assume that the source code of workﬂow tasks is available.
3.1. Explicit information ﬂow analysis
We consider hosts as principals. Objects are system resources such as ﬁles and databases. Each object has an object ID.
Object O in host h is speciﬁed as h : O . Each host h has a host information ﬂow policy, access(h), which speciﬁes the set
of principals who can access the objects in h. This policy can be overruled by an object information ﬂow policy, access(O ),
which speciﬁes the set of hosts to which the information (i.e., the content) of O can ﬂow. Information ﬂows from an
object O 1 to an object O 2 if information stored in O 1 is transferred to O 2 through a sequence of operations such as
assignment statements, ﬁle reading and writing, I/O operations, and parameter passing. Given an information ﬂow policy
access(O ) = {h1, . . . ,hn}, a workﬂow violates this policy if there exists an object O ′ in a host other than h1, . . . ,hn such that
information can ﬂow from O to O ′ .
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speciﬁcation language. Java BeanShell script [1] can be embedded in SCUFL to implement tasks in scientiﬁc workﬂows.
In this paper, we consider scientiﬁc workﬂows speciﬁed using SCUFL and BeanShell script. For clarity of presentation and
illustration purpose, we use an abstract syntax of Java BeanShell to illustrate our information ﬂow analysis techniques. Let w
be a workﬂow, task be an atomic task, ports be a set of ports, prog be a program, vdecl be a set of variable declarations, pdecl
be a set of procedure declarations, stmt be a set of statements, and cond be a set of conditions. Also, let x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn ,
f and fp range over variables, p range over procedure names, and n range over constants. The core language syntax in its
abstract form is given below:
w ::= task | w o,i−→ w
task ::= ports prog ports
prog ::= pdecl; end_prog | pdecl;prog
pdecl ::= proc p(x1, . . . , xn){vdecl; stmts}
stmts ::= stmt; end_stmt | stmt; stmts
stmt ::= x := y | x := n | x = fopen( f ) | x = fread(fp) | fwrite(x, fp) | fclose(fp)
| if cond then stmts else stmts | call p(y1, . . . , yn) | while cond do stmts
w1
o,i−→ w2 speciﬁes a data channel connecting the output port o of w1 and the input port i of w2. Each atomic task
contains a set of input ports {i1, . . . , in}, a program implementing the functionality of the task, and a set of output ports
{o1, . . . ,om}. A program consists of a sequence of procedures separated by “;”. end_prog signals the end of the program. Each
procedure is of the form proc p(x1, . . . , xn){vdecl; stmts} where vdecl is a local variable declaration of the form var x1, . . . , xn
and stmts is a sequence of statements. x = y and x = n represent assignment of a variable y to x and assignment of a
constant n to x, respectively. fopen, fread, and fwrite represent opening, reading, and appending an object, respectively. if
cond then stmt1 else stmt2 is a conditional statement and while cond do stmt is a while loop. call p(y1, . . . , yn) represents the
invocation of procedure p(x1, . . . , xn) with real parameters y1, . . . , yn .
We propose the Hierarchical State Machine for Scientiﬁc Workﬂows (HSMSW), that reﬁnes the HSM to target the model-
ing of scientiﬁc workﬂows and the information ﬂow analysis. HSMSW extends HSM with variable scoping, which enables us
to model languages with nested blocks and different tasks that use the same name to represent different variables. A state
of HSMSW is a set of set of variable assignments, each of which records the variable assignments propagated through one
path. HSMSW assembles modules using transitions that connect exit states of one module with entry states of another
module. Each transition is labeled with an action and a guard. The outgoing transitions of a module are either “and” transi-
tions or “or” transitions, which models parallel split and exclusive choice, respectively. Similarly, the incoming transitions of
a module are either “and” transitions or “or” transitions, which model synchronization and simple merge, respectively. Note
that, our information ﬂow analysis technique reports violation of an information ﬂow property if there exists at least one
path that violates the property. As a result, “and” and “or” transitions are handled in the same manner in the analysis.
Each atomic task in the workﬂow is modeled using an HSMSW specifying the internal structure of the task. Speciﬁcally,
each procedure in the atomic task is modeled as an HSMSW. Local variables of a procedure are local variables of the
corresponding HSMSW. The invocation of a procedure is modeled as a reference to the HSMSW of the procedure. Each
occurrence of an atomic task is modeled as a reference to the corresponding module of the task. The input and output
ports in a scientiﬁc workﬂow are modeled using entry and exit states in HSMSW, respectively. Data channels between two
workﬂow tasks T1 and T2 are modeled as transitions between the two HSMSWs that model T1 and T2. A composite task
(i.e., a task that contains sub-tasks) is modeled as a module with all sub-tasks modeled as modules in HSMSW.
Algorithms 1 and 2 give a procedure for translating an atomic task, speciﬁed using the abstract language deﬁned above,
into HSMSW. While statement is handled in a manner similar to the conditional statement and is not shown in the algo-
rithm. Each variable in HSMSW does not contain its real value, e.g., content read from an object. Instead, the value of each
variable v in HSMSW is either an object ID (when evaluating “fp = fopen( f )”), or a set of object IDs whose information can
potentially ﬂow to v .
Because a scientiﬁc workﬂow may be executed multiple times with different input datasets and parameter values and
multiple workﬂow runs may access the same object, we associate each object O with a set pastﬂow(O ). O i ∈ pastﬂow(O )
iff information has ﬂown from O i to O in previous workﬂow execution. pastﬂow(O ) is ∅ when object O is initially cre-
ated. Below, we use an example to illustrate how pastﬂow(O ) is updated as a result of workﬂow execution. Suppose that
pastﬂow(O 1) = pastﬂow(O 2) = ∅ before a workﬂow W1 is executed and information of an object O 1 is transferred to object
O 2 during the execution of W1. As a result, pastﬂow(O 2) = {O 1}. Next, workﬂow W2 is executed, which reads from O 2 and
writes its content to O 3. To keep track of information propagation, pastﬂow(O 2) is read as well so that we know O 2 con-
tains the information originated from O 1. After W2 ﬁnishes its execution, pastﬂow(O 3) = {O 1, O 2}, indicating that object
O 3 contains the information that originated from both O 1 and O 2.
The top-level function CreateHSMSW(prog) in Algorithm 1 is used to construct an HSMSW for a program prog.
For each procedure proc p(x1, . . . , xn){vdecl, stmts} in the program, an HSMSW Kp is constructed (lines 2–9, Algo-
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1: procedure CreateHSMSW(prog)
2: let prog = proc p(x1, . . . , xn){vdecl; stmts};prog′
3: Create a module Kp , an entry state t and an exit state te
4: Local variables of Kp = variables in vdecl
5: if prog′ == end_prog then
6: return AddMulStmts(stmts, t, te)
7: else
8: return AddMulStmts(stmts, t, te) ∪ CreateHSMSW(prog′)
9: end if
10: procedure AddMulStmts(stmts, t, te)
11: let stmts = stmt; stmts′
12: if stmt is “if cond then stmt1 else stmt2” then
13: if stmts == end_stmt then
14: return AddMulStmts(stmt1, t, te) ∪ AddMulStmts(stmt2, t, te)
15: else
16: Create a state t1
17: K1 = AddMulStmts(stmt1, t, t1)
18: K2 = AddMulStmts(stmt2, t, t1)
19: K3 = AddMulStmts(stmts′, t1, te)
20: return K1 ∪ K2 ∪ K3
21: end if
22: else
23: if stmts == end_stmt then
24: return AddSingleStmt(stmt, t, te)
25: else
26: Create a state t1
27: return AddSingleStmt(stmt, t, t1) ∪ AddMulStmts(stmts′, t1, te)
28: end if
29: end if
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for constructing HSMSW from an atomic task (Cont.).
1: procedure AddSingleStmt(stmt, t, t1)
2: Create a state t1
3: switch (stmt){
4: case “x = y”:
5: return {t x:=y−→ t1}
6: case “x = n”:
7: return {t x:=∅−→ t1}
8: case “fp = fopen( f )”:
9: return {t fp:= f−→ t1}
10: case “x = fread(fp)”:
11: return {t x:=pastﬂow(∗fp)∪{∗fp},ﬂoww (∗fp):=pastﬂow(∗fp) t1}
12: case “fwrite(x, fp)”:
13: return {t ﬂoww (∗fp):=ﬂoww (∗fp)∪x t1}
14: case “call p(y1, . . . , yn)”:
15: constructs a reference R that refers to module Kp
16: return {t xi :=yi−→ entry(R)} ∪ {exit(R) → t1}
17: }
rithm 1). AddMulStmts(stmts, t, te) is used to construct Kp from a sequence of statements stmts of p, an entry state
t of Kp , and an exit state te of Kp . Lines 12–21 of Algorithm 1 construct HSMSWs from a sequence of statements
if (C) then stmt1 else stmt2; stmts′ . We ﬁrst construct two HSMSWs with an entry state t and an exit t1 from stmt1 and
stmt2, respectively. We then construct an HSMSW with entry state t1 and exit state te from stmts′ .
AddSingleStmt(stmt, t, t1) in Algorithm 2 is used to generate transitions with source state t and target state t1, from
a statement stmt that is neither a conditional nor a while statement. Note that if one path of a workﬂow violates an
information ﬂow property, the workﬂow violates this property. Therefore, we consider all paths in the HSMSW regardless
of the conditions in the transitions. As a result, the conditions are omitted during the construction of HSMSW. When fp =
fopen( f ) is processed, the ID of the object f is assigned to fp (lines 8 and 9, Algorithm 2). When processing x = fread(fp), x is
assigned with pastﬂow(∗fp)∪{∗fp}, where ∗fp is the value of fp, i.e., the object ID stored in fp (lines 10 and 11, Algorithm 2).
In addition, a variable ﬂoww(∗fp) is created and is assigned pastﬂow(∗fp) initially. ﬂoww( f ) is used to keep track of a set of
object IDs from which information can potentially ﬂow to f if workﬂow W gets executed. fwrite is similarly handled. fclose
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does not change the state. Lines 14–16 of Algorithm 2 describe how we generate transitions from procedure invocation.
Every time a procedure invocation call p(y1, . . . , yn) is encountered, a reference R is created that points to module Kp . Two
transitions t
xi :=yi−→ entry(R) and exit(R) → t1 are constructed, where entry(R) and exit(R) are the entry and the exit states of
R , respectively, and  indicates that no action is performed.
Analysis algorithm. Every time a scientiﬁc workﬂow is constructed, a corresponding HSMSW is generated. Each task in a
scientiﬁc workﬂow may have parameters whose values are provided by the user who executes the workﬂow. Once a user
provides the input parameter values, the parameter values are passed to the HSMSW constructed and the static information
ﬂow analysis is performed to detect potential information leaks. Let host(h : o) = h. We say that a workﬂow W conforms to
the information ﬂow policy if and only if there does not exist a transition s
ﬂoww (∗ f ):=ﬂoww (∗ f )∪x
s′ in the HSMSW of W such
that host(∗ f ) /∈ access(O ) for some O ∈ value(x).
The analysis algorithm is based on the reachability computation. First, the algorithm chooses a state s whose data is
available and computes a set of states reachable from s. Let s1 = {s11, . . . , s1n}, . . . , and sm = {sm1 , . . . , smk} be m states,
and transitions si
αi−→ t (1  i m) be all incoming transitions of t . Then t is computed as {s11 ∪ eval(s11,α1), . . . , smk ∪
eval(smk,αm)}, where eval(s,α) evaluates the action α on state s. For example, let s = {{x = 1,ﬂoww(h1 : f1) = {h2 : f2}},
{ﬂoww(h1 : f1) = {h3 : f3}}} be a state and let s x:=2,ﬂoww (h1: f1):=ﬂoww (h1: f1)∪{h1: f2} t be a transition. Then t is computed as
{{x = 2,ﬂoww(h1 : f1) = {h2 : f2,h1 : f2}}, {x = 2,ﬂoww(h1 : f1) = {h3 : f3,h1 : f2}}}.
Repeat the above process until it “gets stuck” at a state. A state s is called a stuck state if s waits for inputs from other
states. When a stuck state is encountered, the algorithm ﬁnds another state whose data is available and perform reachability
computation. The algorithm terminates if a violation to the information ﬂow policy is detected or all states whose data are
available have been processed. Once our algorithm reports a violation, the administrators will be prompted to revise the
workﬂow. The workﬂow is executed if no violation is detected in the analysis.
Consider the workﬂow W in Fig. 3, which is a composite task containing two sub-tasks T1 and T2. T1 and T2 execute
in sequential order and the output of T1 acts as the input to T2. T1 reads from input i1 and appends the content read to
ﬁle h2 : f2. T2 reads from i2 and writes to h3 : f3. The HSMSWs of W , T1, and T2 are given in Figs. 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c),
respectively.
Assume that pastﬂow(h1 : f1) = pastﬂow(h2 : f2) = ∅ before W executes. Also, assume that access(h1 : f1) = {h2,h3}
and access(h2 : f2) = {h3}, which specify that only organizations h2 and h3 can access ﬁle f1 of h1 and only organization
h3 can access ﬁle f2 of h2, respectively. Suppose that a user executes the workﬂow W with input h1 : f1, then i1 in
Fig. 4(b) is assigned h1 : f1 and state s1 = {{i1 = h1 : f1}}. After h1 : f1 is read (lines a1 and a2), x = pastﬂow(h1 : f1) ∪ {h1 :
f1} = {h1 : f1}, ﬂoww(h1 : f1) = pastﬂow(h1 : f1) = ∅, and s3 = {{x = {h1 : f1},ﬂoww(h1 : f1) = ∅}}. After x is assigned to
y (line a3), y = {h1 : f1}. When fwrite(y,h2 : f2) is evaluated (lines a5 and a6), ﬂoww(h2 : f2) = {h1 : f1}. Because h2 ∈
access(h1 : f1), the information ﬂow policy is not violated and hence the content of y can be written to h2 : f2. Similarly,
after processing T2, ﬂoww(h3 : f3) = {h1 : f1,h2 : f2}. Since no information ﬂow violation is detected, the workﬂow can be
executed. Now, suppose that we change access(h1 : f1) to {h2}. Then T violates this policy because there exists a transition
s12
ﬂoww (h3: f3):=ﬂoww(h3: f3)∪y s13 such that y = {h1 : f1,h2 : f2} and host(h3 : f3) /∈ access(h1 : f1).
pastﬂow(O ) is updated during the execution of the scientiﬁc workﬂow. For each variable x in the workﬂow, we associate
x with an auxiliary variable auxx , which has the same scoping as x. For each statement s, we insert the corresponding
action generated from Algorithm 3 (with x replaced with auxx) immediately after the statement. For example, auxx := auxy
is inserted after the statement x = y. After the workﬂow ﬁnishes the execution, auxﬂoww (∗ f ) is written back to pastﬂow(∗ f ).
Below, we prove the correctness of our algorithm.
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Theorem 3.1. Given a workﬂow W , the HSMSW HSMSWw of W , and an information ﬂow policy access(O ) = {h1, . . . ,hn}, the fol-
lowing statements hold: (1) W conforms to access(O ) if and only if there does not exist a transition s
ﬂoww (∗ f ):=ﬂoww (∗ f )∪x
s′ in the
HSMSWw such that O ∈ value(x) and host(∗ f ) /∈ access(O ). (2) For every variable v in HSMSWw, value(v) is the set of all objects
from which the information ﬂows to v.
Proof. The theorem is proved by an induction on the size of W .
Base case: HSMSWw has only one transition. An information ﬂow policy can be violated only when W contains at least
one fread statement and one fwrite statement. This means that, only when HSMSWw contains at least two transitions, one
for fread and one for fwrite, the policy can be violated. Our algorithm reports no violation when HSMSWw has only one
transition. Therefore (1) holds.
We now prove the base case for (2). If the transition corresponds to a statement that does not contain fread and
fwrite (no information ﬂows within the workﬂow), then value(x) = ∅ for every variable x in HSMSWw and hence (2)
holds. If the transition corresponds to statement x = fread(fp) (information ﬂows from the object pointed by fp to x), then
value(x) = {∗fp} ∪ pastﬂoww(∗fp) and hence (2) holds. If the transition corresponds to statement fwrite(x, fp), this means
that the content of variable x is written to the object pointed by fp. Since no object is read before the fwrite statement, no
information ﬂows from any object to x and hence no information ﬂows to the object pointed by fp. Our algorithm computes
value(x) = ﬂoww(∗fp) = ∅, which is consistent with the above.
Induction step: Assume that (1) holds for all workﬂows of size k. We now prove that when the size of W is k + 1,
(1) holds as well. Let stmt be the last statement of W . If W \ {stmt} does not conform to access(O ), then W also does
not conform to access(O ). By induction hypothesis, there exists a transition s
ﬂoww (∗ f ):=ﬂoww (∗ f )∪x
s′ in the HSMSWw such
that O ∈ value(x) and host(∗ f ) /∈ access(O ), and hence (1) holds. Otherwise, if stmt is not fwrite(x, fp), then stmt will not
cause access(O ) to be violated and hence W also conforms to access(O ). By induction hypothesis, there does not exist a
transition s
ﬂoww (∗ f ):=ﬂoww (∗ f )∪x
s′ in the HSMSWw such that O ∈ value(x) and host(∗ f ) /∈ access(O ). Thus (1) holds. If stmt
is fwrite(x, fp), then information of x ﬂows to ∗fp. Our algorithm generates action ﬂoww(∗fp) = ﬂoww(∗fp) ∪ x, which means
that ∗fp contains information of x as well as the set of objects from which the information previously ﬂows to ∗fp. By
induction hypothesis, value(x) is the set of all objects from which the information ﬂows to x. Therefore, ﬂoww(∗fp) contains
all information ﬂowed to ∗fp. In this case, access(O ) is violated if and only if information ﬂows from O to x and the host
that owns ∗fp is not allowed to access O , i.e. O ∈ value(x) and host(∗fp) /∈ access(O ). Thus (1) holds.
We now prove (2). If stmt is an assignment statement y = x, then after this assignment, y contains the information of x.
The action in the corresponding transition is y := x, which means that value(y) = value(x). By induction hypothesis, value(x)
is the set of all objects from which the information ﬂows to x, and hence value(y) contains all objects from which the
information ﬂows to y. Thus (2) holds. If stmt is x = fread(fp), then the information ﬂows from ∗fp to x. The action in the
corresponding transition is x := pastﬂow(∗fp) ∪ {∗fp}, ﬂoww(∗fp) := pastﬂow(∗fp). Because pastﬂow(∗fp) contains all objects
from which information ﬂows to ∗fp, x contains all objects from which information ﬂows to x. Thus, (2) holds. Similarly, we
can prove that (2) holds for other statements. 
P. Yang et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 76 (2010) 390–402 397Fig. 5. An example and the corresponding HSMSW for analyzing implicit information ﬂow.
3.2. Implicit information ﬂow analysis
Algorithm 1 deals with only explicit information ﬂow. It does not detect implicit information ﬂow resulting from con-
ditional statements such as if (x == 0) then y = 0; else y = 1. In this statement, y is assigned 0 if the value of x is 0,
and 1 otherwise. From y’s value, we can infer whether x is equal to 0 or not. As a result of execution of this statement,
information of x ﬂows to y implicitly.
We propose to make use of the variable scoping of HSMSW to detect implicit information ﬂow. For every conditional
statement c of the form if cond then stmt1 else stmt2, we construct an HSMSW module K that contains a new local variable
vck , called implicit ﬂow variable, to store the union of values of all variables in cond, denoted as vars(cond). The value of
vck is then propagated to variables that appear on the left-hand side of actions (assignments) generated from statements
contained in c. A nested conditional statement with nesting-depth n is modeled by an HSMSW with nesting-depth n.
Once the HSMSW is constructed, we can directly use the analysis technique presented in Section 3.1 to analyze implicit
information ﬂow.
The algorithm for constructing an HSMSW for analyzing implicit information ﬂow of a conditional statement is given
in Algorithm 3. The HSMSW for while statement can be constructed similarly. The algorithm for constructing HSMSWs for
other statements is similar to that in Algorithm 1. In order to analyze implicit information ﬂow, one parameter vc is added
to AddMulStmts which is used to propagate the value of the implicit ﬂow variable. Given a statement stmt; stmts′ where
stmt is a conditional statement of the form if cond then stmt1 else stmt2, AddMulStmts(stmt; stmts′, t, te,vc) constructs an
HSMSW K from stmt; stmts′ with an entry state t and an exit state t′ as follows. First, a local implicit ﬂow variable vck
is created (line 4) and a transition t
vck :=vars(cond)∪vc t1 is generated which assigns vars(cond) ∪ vc to vck (line 5). Next,
AddMulStmts(stmt1, t1, t′,vck) and AddMulStmts(stmt2, t1, t′,vck) are called, which propagate vck to the left-hand side of the
actions generated through stmt1 and stmt2, respectively (lines 7 and 8). The value of the implicit ﬂow variable is propagated
to all actions except the action generated through fopen and the assignment ﬂoww(∗fp) := pastﬂow(∗fp) generated through
fread. Finally, an  transition from t′ to te is generated (line 9). The sequence of statements stmt; stmts′ where stmts′ =
end_stmt is handled similarly.
Fig. 5(b) gives the HSMSW generated for the example in Fig. 5(a). When the conditional statement if (x > 1) then . . . in
Fig. 5(a) is evaluated, a new module is constructed and a local variable vc1 is created which stores the value of x. The value
of vc1 is them propagated to y and z, which means that the information of x ﬂows to y and z.
3.3. Incremental information ﬂow analysis
If our information ﬂow analysis algorithm detects potential information ﬂow violation in a scientiﬁc workﬂow, the user
who constructed the workﬂow will be prompted to revise the workﬂow. A user may also want to change the structure
of a scientiﬁc workﬂow if she is not satisﬁed with the results produced by the workﬂow. Incremental information ﬂow
analysis is useful when structural changes of a workﬂow lead to small or no changes in the analysis results. In some
cases, a complete re-analysis cannot be avoided, but in most cases, incremental analysis allows us to reuse the previous
analysis results and perform analysis more quickly than a complete re-analysis. In this section, we present techniques for
incremental information ﬂow analysis of scientiﬁc workﬂows. The basic idea is to store the exit states of all modules of
HSMSW constructed in the previous analysis and then incrementally update HSMSW and perform analysis.
We consider the following changes to the structure of a scientiﬁc workﬂow: adding, deleting, or replacing workﬂow
tasks, and adding and deleting data channels. Every time a change is made to the structure of a scientiﬁc workﬂow, our
incremental algorithm starts from the entry states of the top module of HSMSW generated in the previous analysis and
inspects every module and transition to see if it is affected by the change. If so, the algorithm updates the corresponding
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1: procedure AddMulStmts(stmt; stmts′, t, te,vc)
2: let stmt = “if cond then stmt1 else stmt2”
3: Create an HSMSW module K with entry state t and exit state t′
4: Create a new implicit ﬂow variable vck and a state t1
5: Trans1 = {t vck :=vars(cond)∪vc t1}
6: if stmts′ = end_stmt then
7: K1 = AddMulStmts(stmt1, t1, t′,vck)
8: K2 = AddMulStmts(stmt2, t1, t′,vck)
9: return K1 ∪ K2 ∪ Trans1 ∪ {t′ → te}
10: else
11: Create a state t3
12: K1 = AddMulStmts(stmt1, t1, t3,vck)
13: K2 = AddMulStmts(stmt2, t1, t3,vck)
14: K3 = AddMulStmts(stmts′, t3, t′,vc)
15: return K1 ∪ K2 ∪ K3 ∪ Trans1 ∪ {t′ → te}
16: end if
Fig. 6. (a) Speciﬁcation of T3; (b) the corresponding HSMSW of T3.
modules and transitions. The algorithm for updating HSMSW is straightforward: If a task T is deleted from a workﬂow W ,
the corresponding reference in the HSMSW is deleted. If a new task T is added to a workﬂow W , an HSMSW module for
T is constructed and a reference to this module is added correspondingly. Replacing a task T1 with another task T2 can be
reduced to deleting T1 and then adding T2. If a data link is added to (or removed from) the workﬂow, the corresponding
transition will be added to (or removed from) HSMSW.
After the user provides inputs to the scientiﬁc workﬂow, the incremental analysis is performed to detect potential in-
formation ﬂow violation. The algorithm starts from the initial state and traverses HSMSW until a module or a connection
channel that is affected by the change is encountered. Such a module or a connection channel is called an affected point.
The algorithm then re-analyzes HSMSW from the affected point until a violation is detected or no more state is reachable
(i.e., no violation is detected). The following optimizations can be applied when a module K1 is replaced with another
module K2: (1) if the exit state of K2 is the subset of that of K1 and the previous analysis result is false (i.e., no violation
is detected), then the algorithm returns false; and (2) if the exit state of K2 is the superset of that of K1 and the previous
analysis result is true, then the algorithm returns true.
Below, we use the example in Fig. 3 to illustrate our incremental analysis technique. In Section 3, we have shown that
this workﬂow violates the information ﬂow policy access(h1 : f1) = {h2}. During the analysis, we store the value of the
exit state s7 of R2, which contains {ﬂoww(h2 : f2) = {h1 : f1},o1 = {h2 : f2}, . . .}. Because the information ﬂow policy of
h1 : f1 is violated, the user is prompted to revise the workﬂow. Assume that the user replaces task T2 with task T3 in
Fig. 6(a). Because T1 does not change, R2 does not change. Since T2 is replaced with T3, R3 is replaced with a reference
to the HSMSW module of T3, i.e., the HSMSW shown in Fig. 6(b). Our incremental analysis algorithm then starts from
s7 and performs analysis using the technique given in Section 3. The analysis shows that the information ﬂow policy
access(h1 : f1) = {h2} is not violated.
4. Implementation and experimental results
We have developed an information ﬂow analysis tool for scientiﬁc workﬂows, called Infoﬂow Analyzer, whose architecture
is given in Fig. 7. Our Infoﬂow Analyzer was developed over Hermes [5], which is a tool for constructing a hierarchical
reactive machine, an extension of the hierarchical state machine with variable scoping, and performing reachability analysis
on the hierarchical reactive machine. In Hermes, the hierarchical reactive machine can either be drawn manually or be
generated through an XML speciﬁcation. Our Infoﬂow Analyzer differs from Herms as follows: (1) We extended the XML
speciﬁcation of the hierarchical reactive machine in Herms to support the speciﬁcation of “and” and “or” transitions of
HSMSW; (2) We implemented a translator for converting the workﬂow speciﬁcation into the XML speciﬁcation of the
HSMSW; and (3) We implemented the information ﬂow analysis algorithm developed in this paper which performs analysis
on the XML speciﬁcation of the HSMSW.
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Fig. 8 gives the screenshots of HSMSW generated using Infoﬂow Analyzer for a workﬂow containing three tasks. M1
and M2 model tasks T1 and T2 in Fig. 3, respectively. Fig. 8(a) provides a top-level view of HSMSW, which allows users to
provide parameter values and specify the information ﬂow policy. Fig. 8(b) shows that the information ﬂow policy has been
violated by providing a detailed explanation of the cause and highlighting the transition that violates the policy.
Our prototype currently supports only a subset of Java BeanShell containing some basic ﬁle operations and assignment
statements. Further development includes supporting a more expressive subset of Java BeanShell, including database opera-
tions.
Experimental results. We evaluate the scalability of our Infoﬂow Analyzer on workﬂows constructed by composing a num-
ber of modules corresponding to the task T1 in Fig. 3 via connection channels. The number of tasks varies between 2000
(14K states) and 20000 (140K states). Figs. 9(a) and 9(b) give the execution time and memory consumed by Infoﬂow An-
alyzer. All reported results were obtained on an Intel Pentium D machine with 1 GB of RAM running Linux 2.6.24. The
ﬁgures show that it takes Infoﬂow Analyzer less than 100 seconds and less than 800 MB memory to analyze a workﬂow
with 20000 tasks. Obtaining results for more sophisticated real-world workﬂows is left as a topic for future work.
5. Related work
Much work has been done for modeling, analysis, and veriﬁcation of workﬂows [2,3,12,33,30,17,16,25,14,10,9,11,34]. In
this paper, we propose to control information propagation of scientiﬁc workﬂows based on Hierarchical State Machines for
Scientiﬁc Workﬂows (HSMSWs). We exploit the hierarchical structure of HSMSWs to model scientiﬁc workﬂows and perform
analysis directly on HSMSWs without ﬂattening them into ﬁnite state machines, which avoids exponential blow-up caused by
ﬂattening. To the best of our knowledge, no information ﬂow analysis techniques are proposed based on other formalisms.
While early scientiﬁc workﬂow effort demonstrated the capability of database management for supporting scientiﬁc
workﬂows [4], several scientiﬁc workﬂow management systems (SWFMSs) have been developed over the past few years.
The Kepler system [27] is a Java-based open source SWFMS. In Kepler, a scientiﬁc workﬂow is composed from components
called actors and its execution is controlled by a computational model controller called director. Taverna [29] is another
SWFMS targeted for life science. Currently, Taverna supports a repository of Web services for various bioinformatics data
analysis and transformation. Taverna uses an XML-based workﬂow language called SCUFL for workﬂow representation with
each component being either a Web service or a processor developed using Java BeanShell script. The Triana system [13]
has a sophisticated graphical user interface for workﬂow composition and modiﬁcation, including grouping, editing, and
zooming functions. The VisTrails system [19] is developed to manage visualizations and is the ﬁrst system that supports
provenance tracking of workﬂow evolution in addition to tracking the data product derivation history. The Pegasus system
[20] provides a framework which maps complex scientiﬁc workﬂows onto distributed grid resources. Artiﬁcial intelligence
planning techniques are used in Pegasus for workﬂow composition. The Swift system [37] combines a novel scripting lan-
guage called SwiftScript with a powerful runtime system to support the concise speciﬁcation, and reliable and eﬃcient
execution, of large loosely coupled computations over grid environments. Finally, view [24] system features an open and
ﬂexible service-oriented architecture, eﬃcient provenance management using Semantic Web technologies, and advanced
techniques for scientiﬁc data visualization. However, none of the above systems support information ﬂow analysis.
The area of information ﬂow analysis has received considerable attention. The lattice model of information ﬂow was ﬁrst
proposed in [7] and [15]. Recently, a number of information ﬂow control techniques have been developed for decentralized
systems or Web services (e.g. [28,22,31,23,36]). However, none of these work is done in the context of scientiﬁc workﬂows or
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Fig. 9. The execution time and memory consumption of Infoﬂow Analyzer on workﬂows containing 2000–20000 tasks.
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our framework also allows us to verify many other properties such as deadlock-freedom [35]. Guernic et al. [21] present
an automata-based dynamic information ﬂow analysis technique, while the information ﬂow analysis technique presented
in this paper is a static analysis technique. Information ﬂow analysis has also been applied to programs (e.g. [32]), which
checks if information may ﬂow from a variable labeled “high” to a variable labeled “low” in the program. Our technique
does not assume an order exists among variables, which allows us to specify a policy that prevents information from ﬂowing
among arbitrary sets of principals. Second, our analysis technique also accounts for dataﬂows formed from data channels
that connect the input and output ports of workﬂow tasks.
Recently, the Kepler system extends its actor-oriented modeling framework with frames and templates by borrowing
ideas from hierarchical state machines [8]. This approach seamlessly integrates control ﬂows into a dataﬂow-based design
paradigm without sacriﬁcing the beneﬁts of dataﬂows. Although Kepler provides a concrete hybrid model for designing and
executing scientiﬁc workﬂows with both dataﬂows and control ﬂow features, veriﬁcation and information ﬂow analysis are
not part of the framework. In contrast, we aim at developing an abstract model for scientiﬁc workﬂows based on hierarchical
state machines, providing a foundation for formal modeling and analysis of scientiﬁc workﬂows, including information ﬂow
analysis.
In [35], we have presented techniques for verifying and controlling information propagation of scientiﬁc workﬂows.
However, [35] does not handle implicit information ﬂow and does not consider incremental information ﬂow analysis.
The language and the control ﬂow patterns we consider in this paper are also more expressive than those of [35]. For
example, this paper considers synchronization, parallel split, and simple merge, while [35] does not. Further, no prototype
is developed in [35].
6. Conclusions and future work
This paper presents information ﬂow analysis techniques that control the information propagation in scientiﬁc workﬂows.
We consider workﬂows with the following control ﬂow patterns: sequence, exclusive choice, parallel split, synchronization,
simple merge, and conditions. In order to perform formal analysis, we propose a Hierarchical State Machine for Scientiﬁc
Workﬂows (HSMSW) and present information ﬂow analysis techniques to control the information propagation in scientiﬁc
workﬂows based on HSMSW. Our analysis techniques deal with both explicit and implicit information ﬂows. We also present
an eﬃcient algorithm for performing information ﬂow analysis incrementally upon every change to scientiﬁc workﬂows. We
have developed a prototype system, called Infoﬂow Analyzer, to validate and demonstrate our approaches. For future work,
we plan to extend our work to support scientiﬁc workﬂows with Web service components and scientiﬁc workﬂows running
on cloud computing environments [18].
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